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Abstract—The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) system is the most commonly used industrial control
system but is subject to a wide range of serious threats. Intrusion
detection systems are deployed to promote the security of SCADA
systems, but they continuously generate tremendous number of
alerts without further comprehending them. There is a need
for an efficient system to correlate alerts and discover attack
strategies to provide explainable situational awareness to SCADA
operators. In this paper, we present a causal-polytree-based
anomaly reasoning framework for SCADA networks, named
CAPTAR. CAPTAR takes the meta-alerts from our previous
anomaly detection framework EDMAND, correlates the them
using a naive Bayes classifier, and matches them to predefined
causal polytrees. Utilizing Bayesian inference on the causal
polytrees, CAPTAR can produces a high-level view of the security
state of the protected SCADA network. Experiments on a
prototype of CAPTAR proves its anomaly reasoning ability and
its capabilities of satisfying the real-time reasoning requirement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, large-scale distributed critical infrastructure sys-
tems such as power grids and refineries increasingly rely on
digital industrial control systems (ICSs) for real-time moni-
toring, data collection, and control. The Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is the most commonly
used ICS. Critical as they are, SCADA systems are subject to a
wide range of serious threats [1]. Therefore, securing SCADA
systems against various threats and vulnerabilities has become
a major challenge.
To promote the security of SCADA systems, intrusion de-
tection systems (IDSs) are increasingly deployed by SCADA
operators. As the name suggests, the main objective of IDSs
is to monitor the system, detect suspicious activities caused by
intrusion attempts, and report alerts to the system operators.
Although IDSs play an undeniable role in the protection of
SCADA systems, they still suffer from some defects. The
biggest issue with traditional IDSs is that they continuously
generate tremendous number of alerts without further com-
prehending them. Drowned in an ocean of unstructured alerts
mixed with false positives, SCADA operators are almost blind
to see any useful information. Due to the high volume and low
quality of the alerts, it becomes a nearly impossible task for
the operators to figure out the complete pictures of the attacks
and take appropriate actions in a timely manner.
To address the aforementioned problem of traditional IDSs
and provide the SCADA operators with explainable situational
awareness, there is a need for an efficient system to aggregate
redundant alerts from IDSs, correlate them in an intelligent
manner, and discover attack strategies based on domain knowl-
edge as well as causal reasoning. In a previous work [1],
we described our edge-based multi-level anomaly detection
framework for SCADA, named EDMAND. EDMAND resides
at the edges of the SCADA network and detects anomalies
in multiple levels of the network. The triggered alerts are
aggregated, prioritized, and sent to the control center. In this
report, we present a causal-polytree-based anomaly reasoning
framework for SCADA networks, named CAPTAR. CAPTAR
resides in the control center of the SCADA network and takes
the meta-alerts from EDMAND as input (shown in Figure 1).
CAPTAR correlates the alerts using a naive Bayes classifier
and matches them to predefined causal polytrees. Utilizing
Bayesian inference on the causal polytrees, CAPTAR is able
to reveal the attack scenarios from the alerts and produces a
high-level view of the security state of the protected SCADA
network.
Fig. 1: Locations of EDMAND and CAPTAR
The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Section
II reviews the related work. Section III introduces the basic
concept of Bayesian network, Bayesian inference, and belief
propagation. These concepts are utilized in the anomaly rea-
soning in this report. Two canonical models which are used
to build our causal polytrees are also introduced in Section
III. Section IV gives an overview of the design of CAPTAR.
Section V shows the performance evaluation of CAPTAR and
Section VI concludes the report. Since this report uses many
difference notations, some of the most important notations are
listed in Table I for quick reference.
II. RELATED WORK
Various techniques have been used to measure the similarity
of common features of alerts to correlate them [2]–[5]. How-
ever, alert correlation alone can only measure the correlation
strength between alerts and are not sufficient to recognize the
whole picture of the attack.
To fill the gap of alert correlation, many works have been
proposed in the area of attack plan recognition. Some works
[6], [7] keep the state of the system and assume that the state
Notation Description
X A node in the Bayesian network representing a random variable.
U A parent of X in the Bayesian network.
Y A child of X in the Bayesian network.
e
+
X Evidence contained in the sub-tree rooted at X .
e
−
X Evidence contained in the rest of the Bayesian network other than e
+
X .
piX(u) Causal support provided by parent U to X .
λY (x) Diagnostic support provided by child Y to X .
BEL(x) Belief at node X .
X˜ Auxiliary child node ofX to simulate evidence of matched meta-alerts.
λ
X˜
(x) Diagnostic support provided by X˜ to X .
I Inhibitory mechanism in “noisy-OR” model.
E Enabling mechanism in “noisy-AND” model.
q Probability that the inhibitory or enabling mechanism is active.
CS(a) Confidence score of meta-alert a.
AT Attack template.
ATS Attack template set.
SAT Set of consequence nodes of attack template AT .
AU Alert unit.
w Weight in the alert unit.
A Alert type in the alert unit.
CStotal Total confidence score of all matched meta-alerts of a node.
BELmax(AT ) Maximum probability of existence of all consequence nodes in AT .
Cormax Maximum correlation score of a meta-alert in an attack template.
ATSmatch Attack template set containing alert matching results.
Xcor Exact match node with the highest correlation score for a meta-alert.
Xpot Set of potential nodes a meta-alert could match to.
K Maximum number of attack templates to keep for each kind of attack.
M Number of meta-alerts in the meta-alert database.
N Maximum number of nodes in any attack template.
L Number of attack templates in the attack template database.
TABLE I: Table of notation
evolves towards a “worse” direction during attacks. There are
also works [8], [9] that define prerequisites and consequences
of each attack step and construct chains or graphs based
on the matching of prerequisites and consequences. Bayesian
networks are also utilized by many papers [8], [10]–[13] to
correlate alerts or to represent and infer the causal relationship
between attack steps.
The closest previous work [14] to ours is the integration
of alert aggregation, prioritization, correlation, and attack
plan recognition. Three alert correlation methods are pro-
posed: probabilistic-based, causal discovery-based, and tem-
poral based methods. The attack plan recognition step also
uses causal polytrees to represent attack plans.
CAPTAR mainly differentiates from all previous works in
two aspects. First, the alerts received by CAPTAR are meta-
alerts generated by EDMAND, which is our edge-based multi-
level anomaly detection framework for SCADA. EDMAND
applies network-based rather than host-based detection and
it mainly takes the anomaly-based approach instead of the
signature-based approach. The alerts from EDMAND do not
directly relate to each attack step in the attack plan but instead
relate to various network behaviors triggered by each attack
step. Therefore, mapping between alerts from EDMAND and
underlying attack steps is necessary for our anomaly reasoning.
Second, we define the concept of confidence score for each
alert in EDMAND. In CAPTAR, the confidence scores of
meta-alerts are utilized to calculate the diagnostic support for
each node in the causal polytrees during the belief propagation.
This allows each alert to carry more belief information instead
of only a binary state (exist/not exist).
III. PRELIMINARIES
An example workflow of EDMAND and CAPTAR is shown
in Figure 2. After an attacker launches an attack, each step of
the attack could result in one or more anomalies in the network
traffic. These anomalies trigger meta-alerts in EDMAND.
CAPTAR receives the meta-alerts from EDMAND and tries
to infer the attack steps that triggered them by mapping meta-
alerts to attack steps. Potential attack steps are structured as
nodes in causal polytrees whose nature are Bayesian networks.
Bayesian inference is performed on those causal polytrees to
reason about the existence of attacks. In this section, we first
Fig. 2: An example workflow of EDMAND and CAPTAR
introduce the basic concept of Bayesian network. Then we
describe inference in Bayesian network followed by the belief
propagation algorithm to conduct Bayesian inference. Finally,
we present two canonical models we use to build our causal
trees: “noisy-OR” and“noisy-AND” models.
A. Bayesian Network
Before going into exactly what a Bayesian network is, it is
first useful to review two concepts in probability theory. The
first concept is the chain rule of probability. It says that if
we have a set of n random variables, X1, X2, . . . , Xn, then
the joint probability distribution P (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) can be
written as a product of n conditional probabilities:
P (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) =
P (Xn|Xn−1, . . . , X2, X1) · · ·P (X2|X1)P (X1).
(1)
The second concept is the conditional independence. We
say that two random variables, A and B, are conditionally
independent given another random variable C if P (A|B,C) =
P (A|C). In other words, once we know C, learning B would
not change our belief in A.
After recalling the chain rule of probability and the condi-
tional independence, we can introduce the basics of Bayesian
network. A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) in which the nodes represent variables, the edges
signify the existence of direct causal influences between the
linked variables, and the strengths of these influences are
expressed by conditional probabilities. Figure 3 illustrates a
simple yet typical Bayesian network. It describes relationships
among the seasons of the year (X1), whether rain falls (X2),
whether the sprinkler is on (X3), whether the pavement would
get wet (X4), and whether the pavement would be slippery
(X5). All variables in this figure are binary (taking a value of
either true or false) except for the root variable X1, which can
take one of four values: spring, summer, fall, or winter.
Each edge in the figure represents a direct causal influence
from the head of the edge to the tail. In Figure 3, X4 has a
directed edge pointing to X5. This is because the fact that the
pavement is wet has a direct causal influence on whether the
pavement is slippery. On the contrary, the absence of a direct
edge between two nodes implies conditional independence.
For example, the absence of a direct edge between X1 and
X5 captures the understanding that the influence of seasonal
Fig. 3: Bayesian network example
variations on the slipperiness of the pavement is mediated by
other conditions (e.g., the wetness of the pavement).
Each node in the Bayesian network is associated with a
probability function that takes (as input) a particular set of
values for the node’s parent variables, and gives (as output)
the probability of the variable represented by the node. The
most common form of this probability function is a conditional
probability table (CPT). CPT is a table defined for a set of
discrete and mutually dependent random variables to display
conditional probabilities of a single variable with respect to the
others. An example CPT of X4 in Figure 3 is shown in Table
II. It gives the conditional probabilities of P (X4|X2, X3).
X2 X3 X4 = T X4 = F
F F 0.0 1.0
F T 0.8 0.2
T F 0.9 0.1
T T 0.99 0.01
TABLE II: Conditional probability table of X4
An important property of Bayesian networks is the local
(parental) Markov condition, which states that every node
in a Bayesian network is conditionally independent of all
its non-descendants given its parent. In the above example,
we have P (X5|X1, X2, X3, X4) = P (X5|X4) since Slippery
is conditionally independent of its non-descendants, Season,
Sprinkler, and Rain, given its parent Wet. This property allows
us to simplify the joint distribution, obtained using the chain
rule, to a simpler form. Assume a Bayesian network has
n nodes X1, . . . , Xn in total. The joint distribution can be
simplified as
P (X1, . . . , Xn) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi|X1, . . . , Xi−1) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi|Parents(Xi)),
(2)
where Parents(Xi) is the set of direct parents of Xi. In the
above example, we are able to rewrite the joint distribution as
P (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5) =
P (X1)P (X2|X1)P (X3|X1)P (X4|X2, X3)P (X5|X4).
(3)
This property significantly reduces the amount of required
computation in large Bayesian networks since each node
usually has fewer parents compared with the overall size of
the network.
B. Bayesian Inference
There are two kinds of inference over a Bayesian network.
The first is to evaluate the joint probability of a specific
assignment of values for all or a subset of variables in the
network. For all variables, we simply factorize the joint prob-
ability using Equation 2 and calculate the product using pro-
vided conditional probabilities. For a subset of variables, we
marginalize over the variables not in the subset by summing
up probabilities over them and get the marginal probability of
the subset of variables we are interested in.
The second and more interesting inference is to evaluate
P (x|e), that is, the probability of some particular assignment
of a subset of variables (x) given assignments of other vari-
ables (evidence e). In the scenario we mentioned in Section
III-A, one example of this kind of inference could be to
evaluate P (X2 = T,X4 = T,X5 = T |X1 = spring).
In this case, {X2 = T,X4 = T,X5 = T } is our x and
{X1 = spring} is our e. According to the definition of
conditional probability, we have P (x|e) = P (x, e)/P (e) =
αP (x, e), where α = 1/P (e) is a normalizing constant
rendering
∑
x
P (x|e) = 1. LetZ represent the set of variables
in the network that is not in x and e, and z represents any
particular value assignment of Z. To get P (x, e), the marginal
probability of {x, e} over Z needs to be calculated. Therefore,
we have
P (x|e) = α
∑
∀z∈Z
P (x, e, z). (4)
In the example, we can calculate P (X2 = T,X4 = T,X5 =
T |X1 = spring) as
P (X2 = T,X4 = T,X5 = T |X1 = spring)
= α
∑
X3
P (X1 = spring)P (X2 = T |X1 = spring)
P (X3|X1 = spring)P (X4 = T |X2 = T,X3)
P (X5 = T |X4 = T )
= αP (X1 = spring)P (X2 = T |X1 = spring)
P (X3 = T |X1 = spring)P (X4 = T |X2 = T,X3 = T )
P (X5 = T |X4 = T ) + αP (X1 = spring)
P (X2 = T |X1 = spring)P (X3 = F |X1 = spring)
P (X4 = T |X2 = T,X3 = F )P (X5 = T |X4 = T ) (5)
C. Belief Propagation
Belief propagation via message passing [15] is an algorithm
to conduct inference on Bayesian networks. To make it clearer,
we first illustrate the belief propagation rules in a general
tree-structured Bayesian network where a node might have
several children and one parent. In the next subsection, we
will introduce the two canonical models which generalize our
causal trees to polytrees.
Fig. 4: Fragment of a causal tree, showing different kinds of
evidence and support of a node X
We illustrate the belief propagation by specifying the ac-
tivities of a typical node X having m children, Y1, Y2, . . . ,
Ym, and a parent U as shown in Figure 4. The belief in the
various values of X depends on two distinct sets of evidence:
evidence from the sub-tree rooted at X , and the evidence
from the rest of the tree. In general, let us define e−X as the
evidence contained in the tree rooted at X and define e+X as
the evidence contained in the rest of the network. e−Yj therefore
represents the evidence from the sub-tree rooted at Yj where
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. x ∈ {0, 1} is a particular value of X and
u ∈ {0, 1} is a particular value of U . The belief distribution
of variable X can be calculated based on the following three
kinds of parameters:
1) Causal Support: piX(u) = P (u|e
+
X), contributed by
parent of X .
2) Diagnostic Support: λYj (x) = P (e
−
Yj
|x), contributed by
the Yj which is the j-th child ofX where j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
3) Conditional Probability Table (CPT): P (x|u) that relates
the variable X to its direct parent U . Each entry P (x|u)
in the table defines the probability of value x of node X
given certain value u of node U .
We utilize the tree-structured Bayesian network for our
anomaly reasoning. Each node represents an attack step in
the entire attack plan and it has two states of exist (1) and not
exist (0). A direct edge from node U to node X means that
attack step U is a direct prior step of attack step X and needs
to be launched before X . In this way, we are able to reason
about the probability of existence of the attack by calculating
the belief of each attack step.
The belief propagation algorithm runs whenever new evi-
dence is found in the tree. The propagation starts from the node
which receives the new evidence and the new belief propagates
along the edges of the tree until all nodes get updated. The
local belief updating at each node X can be executed by three
steps in any order.
Belief Propagation Algorithm
Step 1 — Belief updating: Node X updates its belief mea-
sure based on the piX(u) message from its parent and the
messages λY1(x), λY2(x), . . . , λYm(x) from each of its
children as shown in Figure 4.
BEL(x) = αλ(x)pi(x), (6)
where
λ(x) =
∏
j
λYj (x), (7)
pi(x) =
∑
u
P (x|u)piX(u), (8)
and α is a normalizing constant rendering
∑
xBEL(x) = 1.
Step 2 — Bottom-up propagation: As shown in Figure 6,
nodeX computes a new message λX(u) based on its CPT and
λ messages received from its children. Then X sends λX(u)
to its parent U .
λX(u) =
∑
x
λ(x)P (x|u), (9)
Fig. 5: Bottom-up propagation
Step 3 — Top-down propagation: As shown in Figure 5,
node X computes new pi messages and sends them to its
children. The new piYj (x) message for its j-th child Yj is
calculated as
piYj (x) = αpi(x)
∏
k 6=j
λYk(x). (10)
Fig. 6: Top-down propagation
Boundary conditions are established as follows:
1) Root nodes: If X is a node with no parents, we set pi(x)
equal to the prior probability P (x).
2) Anticipatory nodes: If X is a childless node that has not
been instantiated, we set λ(x) = 1 for x ∈ {0, 1}
3) Evidence nodes: In our anomaly reasoning, evidence for
a nodeX is obtained when meta-alerts are matched to the
node. We will discuss the matching mechanism in Section
IV-D. When evidence is obtained forX , we add a dummy
auxiliary child node X˜ to X as shown in Figure 7 and
simulate the evidence by letting X˜ provide a diagnostic
support message λ
X˜
(x) to X . We will describe our way
to calculate λ
X˜
(x) in Section IV-B. This auxiliary node
X˜ is not updated during the belief propagation using the
3 steps mentioned. It only changes the way X calculates
its own λ(x). Therefore, if evidence of X is obtained,
Equation 7 needs to be rewritten as
λ(x) = λ
X˜
(x)
∏
j
λYj (x). (11)
Fig. 7: Auxiliary child X˜ of X representing evidence received
by X
D. The “noisy-OR” and“noisy-AND” Models
In Section III-C, we illustrate the belief propagation algo-
rithm in a general tree-structured Bayesian network where a
node has at most one parent. However, this structure lacks
the ability to represent nodes that might have multiple causes
(i.e., node may have multiple parents). In this subsection, we
introduce two canonical models which allow us to generalize
our causal trees to causal polytrees. A polytree is a directed
acyclic graph whose underlying undirected graph is a tree.
An example polytree is shown in Figure 8. The difference
between a polytree and a normal tree is that a node could
have multiple parents in a polytree. The two canonical models
contain structures similar to logical OR-gate and AND-gate
with noises and are thus called “noisy-OR” and “noisy-AND”
models. The characteristics of these two typical structures
enable us to conduct the belief updating more efficiently in
polytrees.
Fig. 8: Polytree example
Fig. 9: The noisy OR-gate
1) The “noisy-OR” Model: The “noisy-OR” model [15]
is based on the noisy OR-gate structure shown in Figure 9.
Each node represents an event (attack step in our anomaly
reasoning) with binary state 0 or 1. For a node X with n
parents U = {U1, U2, . . . , Un}, its value can be seen as the
output of a logical OR-gate. Each input to the OR-gate is
the output of an AND-gate representing the conjunction of Ui
and the negation of its specific inhibitory mechanism Ii. The
inhibitors I1, . . . , In represent exceptions or abnormalities that
interfere with the normal relationship between U and X . We
use qi to represent the probability that the i-th inhibitor is
active. Assume all inputs are 0 except Ui = 1. X will only
be 1 if and only if the inhibitor Ii associated with Ui remains
inactive. That is,
P (X = 1|Ui = 1, Uk = 0 k 6= i) = 1− qi. (12)
Therefore, ci = 1−qi represents the degree to which the single
cause Ui = 1 can endorse the consequent event X = 1. Let
u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) ui ∈ {0, 1} (13)
represent any assignment of values to parent set U . Note that
both u and U are vectors sinceX could have multiple parents.
Let Tu = {i : Ui = 1} represent the subset of parents that are
1. In the “noisy-OR” model, a link matrix P (x|u) is used to
relate X to its parent set U and can be written as
P (x|u) =
{∏
i∈Tu
qi if x = 0
1−
∏
i∈Tu
qi if x = 1.
(14)
Having the link matrix P (x|u), we can follow similar belief
propagation algorithm described in Section III-C. Assume X
has m children, Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym. As it is shown in Figure 10,
the local belief updating at X can be also executed by three
steps in any order.
Fig. 10: Belief propagation in causal polytree
Belief Propagation Algorithm in “Noisy-OR” Model
Step 1 — Belief updating: Node X updates its belief mea-
sure based on the pi1X , . . . , pinX from its parents and the
λY1(x), . . . , λYm(x) from its children:
BEL(x) =
{
αλ0
∏
i(1 − cipiiX) if x = 0
αλ1
[
1−
∏
i(1− cipiiX)
]
if x = 1,
(15)
where
λ(x) =
∏
j
λYj (x) =
{
λ0 if x = 0
λ1 if x = 1
, (16)
piiX = P (ui = 1), (17)
and α is a normalizing constant rendering
∑
x BEL(x) = 1.
Step 2 — Bottom-up propagation: Node X computes new
λX(ui) messages and sends them to its parents U . The new
λX(ui) message for its i-th parent Ui is calculates as
λX(ui) =
{
β
[
λ0qiΠ
′
i + λ1(1− qiΠ
′
i)
]
if ui = 1
β
[
λ0Π
′
i + λ1(1−Π
′
i)
]
if ui = 0,
(18)
where
Π′i =
∏
k 6=i
(1− ckpikX), (19)
and β is a normalizing constant.
Step 3 — Top-down propagation: Node X computes new
piYj (x) messages and sends them to its children. The new
piYj (x) message for its j-th child Yj is calculated as
piYj (x) = α
BEL(x)
λYj (x)
. (20)
Fig. 11: The noisy AND-gate
2) The “noisy-AND” Model: The “noisy-AND” model [15]
is based on the noisy AND-gate structure shown in Figure 11.
The value of a node X with n parents U = {U1, U2, . . . , Un}
can be seen as the output of a logical AND-gate. Each input
to the AND-gate is the output of an OR-gate representing the
conjunction of Ui and the its specific enabling mechanism Ei.
We use qi to represent the probability that the i-th enabler is
active. Assume all inputs are 1 except Ui = 0. X will be 0 if
and only if the enabler Ei associated with Ui remains inactive.
That is,
P (X = 1|Ui = 0, Uk = 1 k 6= i) = qi. (21)
Let ci = 1 − qi and use Fu = {i : Ui = 0} to represent the
subset of parents that are 0. The link matrix P (x|u) can be
written as
P (x|u) =
{
1−
∏
i∈Fu
qi if x = 0∏
i∈Fu
qi if x = 1.
(22)
Assume X has m children, Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym. The three steps
of local belief updating at X are listed as follows.
Belief Propagation Algorithm in “Noisy-AND” Model
Step 1 — Belief updating: Node X updates its belief mea-
sure based on the pi1X , . . . , pinX from its parents and the
λY1(x), . . . , λYm(x) from its children:
BEL(x) =
{
αλ0
{
1−
∏
i
[
1− ci(1− piiX)
]}
if x = 0
αλ1
∏
i
[
1− ci(1− piiX)
]
if x = 1,
(23)
where
λ(x) =
∏
j
λYj (x) =
{
λ0 if x = 0
λ1 if x = 1
, (24)
piiX = P (ui = 1), (25)
and α is a normalizing constant rendering
∑
xBEL(x) = 1.
Step 2 — Bottom-up propagation: Node X computes new
λX(ui) messages and sends them to its parents U . The new
λX(ui) message for its i-th parent Ui is calculates as
λX(ui) =
{
β
[
λ0(1−Π′i) + λ1Π
′
i
]
if ui = 1
β
[
λ0(1− qiΠ′i) + λ1qiΠ
′
i
]
if ui = 0,
(26)
where
Π′i =
∏
k 6=i
[
1− ck(1− pikX)
]
, (27)
and β is a normalizing constant.
Step 3 — Top-down propagation: Node X computes new
pi messages and send them to its children. The new piYj (x)
message for its j-th child Yj is calculates as
piYj (x) = α
BEL(x)
λYj (x)
. (28)
IV. DESIGN OVERVIEW
As we mentioned in Section I, CAPTAR resides in the
control center of the SCADA network and its inputs are meta-
alerts sent by EDMAND at the edge of the network. In this
section, we present a design overview of CAPTAR. The main
architecture of CAPTAR is shown in Figure 12. CAPTAR
consists of 4 components: (1)Meta-alert Database, (2)Attack
Template Database, (3)Alert Correlator, (4)Causal Reasoning
Engine.
Fig. 12: CAPTAR architecture
The meta-alert database is used to store the meta-alerts
from EDMAND. These meta-alerts serve as evidence to our
causal reasoning of anomalies. The attack template database
stores the potential attack templates which are causal poly-
trees created by domain experts. These attack templates are
Bayesian networks mentioned in Section III-A and contain the
“noisy-OR” and “noisy-AND” models mentioned in Section
III-D. They represent the prior domain knowledge we have on
potential attack plans and are used as the underlying Bayesian
networks for the belief propagation mentioned in Section III-C.
One important step to reason about the anomalies is to match
meta-alerts to nodes (attack steps) in our attack templates.
And to do that, we need to evaluate whether one meta-
alert is correlated with other meta-alerts. The alert correlator
takes two meta-alerts as inputs and outputs a correlation score
which is used to decide whether the two input meta-alerts
are correlated or not. The core component of CAPTAR is the
causal reasoning engine which interacts with all other three
components. When the causal reasoning engine is started, it
fetches copies of the attack templates in the database and
conducts alert matching as well as belief propagation on them.
The meta-alerts are retrieved from the meta-alert database
and the alert matching is done using the alert correlator.
Whenever the belief of an attack is high enough, the engine
outputs the causal polytree corresponding to that attack with
matched alerts. The operator can further analyze the believes
and matched alerts in the causal polytree to understand each
step of the attack.
In the following subsections, we will introduce the meta-
alert, the attack template, the alert correlator, and the causal
reasoning engine in more detail.
A. Meta-alert
Meta-alerts are generated by EDMAND [1] and sent to the
control center where CAPTAR resides. Each meta-alert is the
aggregation of similar alerts. Each meta-alert has several fields
which are listed in Table III. The fields that will be used
in CAPTAR are alert id, alert type, index field, timestamp,
confidence score. Alert id is a string that is unique for each
meta-alert. The received meta-alerts from EDMAND will
be first stored in the meta-alert database (implemented by
MongoDB). The alert id serves as the key to locate and
retrieve the meta-alert from the database. Alert type is a name
that briefly describes the meta-alert. The current prototype of
EDMAND generates 24 types of alerts from the transport,
operation, and content levels. A complete list of the alert types
is shown in Table IV. For simplicity reason, we assign an alert
type index to each alert type and we will use the index to
represent the corresponding alert type. Index field of the meta-
alert contains additional information that helps to describe the
meta-alert, such as IP addresses, protocol, service, etc. This
field is later used by the alert correlator to correlate meta-
alerts. Timestamp field simply contains a pair of timestamps
(start time, end time). They are the timestamps of the earliest
and the latest alerts that have been aggregated to the meta-
alert. Confidence score field in the meta-alert represents the
confidence that the meta-alert is an anomaly indeed. It is the
maximum of the confidence scores of all the aggregated alerts
for this meta-alert. As we mentioned in [1], the confidence
score (CS) for alert is calculated by CS =MA×AS, where
MA is the model accuracy and AS is the anomaly score. As
stated in Section III-C, if meta-alerts are matched to a node
X in our causal polytree, an auxiliary child node X˜ is added
to X . The confidence scores of the matched meta-alerts are
used to calculate the diagnostic support message λ
X˜
(x) that X˜
provides to X . The way to calculate λ
X˜
(x) will be introduced
in Section IV-B.
B. Attack Template
As we mentioned in Section III, we utilize causal polytrees
to reason about anomalies in SCADA networks. We call
these special causal polytrees attack templates and use AT s
to represent them. Attack templates represent and store the
prior domain knowledge we have for attacks. When an attack
Alert Field Description
alert id
a unique id for retrieving a meta-alert
from the database
alert type
a name that describes the meta-alert
(see Table IV)
index field
a set of auxiliary information that
helps to describe the meta-alert
timestamp
a start time and an end time
for the meta-alert
confidence score
the confidence that the meta-alert
represents an anomaly
statistical fields more detailed information about
the last alert aggregatedanomaly data
count
number of alerts aggregated
by the meta-alert
TABLE III: Meta-alert fields and description
Index Alert Type
0 PACKET_IAT
1 PACKET_BYTES
2 NEW_ORIG
3 NEW_RESP
4 NEW_PROTOCOL
5 NEW_SERVICE
6 PACKET_AB_TOO_MANY
7 PACKET_AB_TOO_FEW
8 PACKET_BA_TOO_MANY
9 PACKET_BA_TOO_FEW
10 MEAN_BYTES_AB_TOO_LARGE
11 MEAN_BYTES_AB_TOO_SMALL
12 MEAN_BYTES_BA_TOO_LARGE
13 MEAN_BYTES_BA_TOO_SMALL
14 OPERATION_TOO_LATE
15 OPERATION_TOO_EARLY
16 OPERATION_MISSING
17 INVALID_FUNCTION_CODE
18 RESPONSE_FROM_ORIG
19 REQUEST_FROM_RESP
20 NEW_OPERATION
21 BINARY_FAULT
22 ANALOG_TOO_LARGE
23 ANALOG_TOO_SMALL
TABLE IV: Alert type
is launched, the triggered meta-alerts from EDMAND are
matched to the corresponding attack template and the belief
propagation mentioned in Section III-C is conducted on it.
An example attack template for the data integrity attack is
shown in Figure 13. Each node X in an attack template
AT is an attack step with zero, one, or multiple parents
and children. Each parent represents a prior cause attack step
that can lead to the current one and each child represents a
posterior consequence attack step that the current one can
lead to. If there are multiple parents, they follow either the
“noisy-OR” or the “noisy-AND” model in Section III-D. The
prior probability at each node, the probabilities qis of the
inhibitory or enabling mechanisms in “noisy-OR” and “noisy-
AND” models are all specified by domain experts (e.g. power
grid/SCADA security administrator) when the attack template
is created. Also, each attack template AT contains one or more
sink nodes (shaded node in Figure 13). Denote the set of sink
nodes as SAT . Nodes in SAT represent the final targets of
the entire attack and we call them consequence nodes. Each
consequence node has domain knowledge associated with such
as attack consequence, severity, and potential countermeasure.
Fig. 13: An example of an attack template (causal polytree)
using the “noisy-OR” model
Each attack step (each node) has two binary states: not
exist (0) and exist (1). However, the attack steps cannot be
observed directly. We can only infer the existence of each
attack step by the alerts it triggers in EDMAND. Each attack
step could trigger meta-alerts that belong to multiple1 alert
types mentioned in Section IV-A. Multiple meta-alerts can
match to one alert type of an attack step. As we mentioned in
Section III-C, these alerts are treated as evidence to each attack
step node. We create a structure, called alert unit table, to
store the matched meta-alerts at each attack step. An example
of the alert unit table is shown in Table V. Each row in the
table is an alert unit (AU ), which represents one proportion
of evidence. Let us assume there are k alert units in the table.
Each alert unit AU i consists of a weight wi and a list of
alert types Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aini , where ni is the number of alert
types in AU i. Therefore, AU i = {wi, Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aini}.
As we mentioned in Section IV-A, our current prototype of
EDMAND can generate 24 types of alerts. Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aini
are represented by the alert type indexes in Table IV for
simplicity reason. wi represents how much the observation
of one or more of the following alert types Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aini
can prove the existence of the attack step and
∑
i wi = 1.
Alert types in the same alert unit express the same aspect
of the attack step. Each alert type Aij in the alert unit table
can contain multiple meta-alerts from EDMAND of the same
corresponding alert type. For example, in the “data integrity
attack” attack step in Figure 13, the alert unit table contains
one alert unit {1, 21, 22, 23}. Since there is just one alert unit,
its weight is 1. The three alert types are 21, 22, and 23,
1It is also possible that one attack step triggers no alerts in EDMAND. In
this case, we can only infer the existence of this attack step by the existence
of its parents and children.
which represent BINARY_FAULT, ANALOG_TOO_LARGE,
and ANALOG_TOO_SMALL. These three types of content-
level meta-alerts all represent the actual tampering of the
measurement data and are therefore included in the same alert
unit.
Alert Unit Weight Alert Types
AU 1 w1 A11, A12, . . . , A1n1
AU 2 w2 A21, A22, . . . , A2n2
...
...
...
AU k wk Ak1, Ak2, . . . , Aknk
TABLE V: Alert unit table for each attack step
As we mentioned in Section III-C, if meta-alerts are
matched to a node X and stored in its alert unit table,
an auxiliary child node X˜ is added to X . The confidence
scores of the matched meta-alerts are used to calculate the
diagnostic support message λ
X˜
(x) that X˜ provides to X .
To calculate λ
X˜
(x), we utilize the confidence score of each
meta-alert mentioned in Section IV-A. For each alert type Aij
in the alert unit table, we assume there are mij meta-alerts
aij1, aij2, . . . , aijmij matched to it (the matching mechanism
will be described in Section IV-D). The confidence scores of
them are CS (aij1),CS (aij2), . . . ,CS(aijmij ). Let CS (Aij)
be the confidence score of the alert type Aij and it is calculated
as
CS (Aij) =
∏mij
l=1 CS (aijl)∏mij
l=1 CS (aijl) +
∏mij
l=1 (1− CS (aijl))
mij > 0
Pmiss mij = 0,
(29)
where Pmiss is a probability of missing meta-alerts and can
be predefined by experience or calculated if training data is
available. After we have confidence score calculated for every
alert type in one alert unit AU i, we can write the confidence
score of the alert unit CS (AU i) as
CS (AU i) =
ni
max
j=1
CS (Aij). (30)
The final total confidence score of the attack step CS total is
calculated by
CS total =
k∑
i=1
wiCS (AU i). (31)
The diagnostic support λ
X˜
(x) provided by all the matched
alerts to the attack step X is written as
λ
X˜
(x) =
{
1− CS total if x = 0
CS total if x = 1
. (32)
Attack templates are created by domain experts and stored
in the attack template database before we start the anomaly
reasoning. At the beginning of the reasoning, the causal rea-
soning engine will fetch copies of the original attack templates
and create an attack template set ATS. Then the engine
conducts alert matching as well as the belief propagation
mentioned in Section III-C on them. Each attack template AT
in ATS originates from one attack template in the database.
And multiple attack templates in ATS could correspond to
the same attack (same attack template in the database). For
each attack step X in an attack template AT , BELX(1)
represents the probability of existence of this attack step.
The way to calculate BELX(1) is introduced in Section III.
Since consequence nodes in SAT stand for final targets of the
entire attack represented by AT , the maximum probability
of existence of all consequence nodes in AT , denoted by
BELmax(AT ), can represent the inferred success possibility
of the attack and is calculated as
BELmax(AT ) = max
X∈SAT
BELX(1). (33)
C. Alert Correlator
Fig. 14: Alert correlation model
CAPTAR’s anomaly reasoning consists of meta-alert match-
ing and belief propagation. Meta-alert matching is the process
of matching meta-alerts to attack steps (in attack templates)
that trigger them. And the most important step of alert match-
ing is to decide whether two meta-alerts are correlated or not.
Therefore, the alert correlator is designed for this purpose. The
alert correlator is a naive Bayes classifier whose graphical
representation is a Bayesian network in Figure 14 with one
root node X and three leaf nodes Y1, Y2, and Y3. The root
node X represents the hypothesis that “the two input meta-
alerts are correlated” and has two states: “yes” (1) and “no”
(0). Each leaf node Yj (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) stands for one type
of observable evidence that helps to evaluate the hypothesis
and has several discrete states. Depending on whether two
meta-alerts are correlated or not, the distribution of states
at the evidence nodes will be different. Therefore, based on
the observed states at the evidence nodes, one can infer the
probability that two meta-alerts are correlated. We consider
three kinds of observable evidence while correlating two meta-
alerts: time difference (Y1), IP similarity (Y2), and whether
they share the same service (Y3).
• Time difference: The state of Y1 depends on the closeness
in the time axis of the two meta-alerts and we use Tdiff
to represent that. As we described in Section IV-A, each
meta-alert from EDMAND has a start time and an end
time. If the two meta-alerts overlap, we assign 0 to Tdiff .
Otherwise, we calculate Tdiff as the difference between
the end time of the earlier meta-alert and the start time of
the latter one. Y1 has four corresponding states according
to Tdiff :
Y1 =

0 if Tdiff ≤ 60seconds
1 if 60seconds < Tdiff ≤ 1hour
2 if 1hour < Tdiff ≤ 1day
3 if Tdiff > 1day
. (34)
• IP similarity: The state of Y2 depends on the similarity
of IP addresses related to the two meta-alerts. Each
meta-alert could have one or two related IP addresses.
Content-level alerts have one measure source IP while
transport and operation level alerts have two IPs for
originator and responder. For every pair of IP addresses
(IPa, IPb), where IPa relates to one input meta-alert
and IPb relates to the other, we calculate the similarity
of them as follows:
SIM (IPa, IPb) =
3 IPa and IPb are exactly the same
2
IPa and IPb are not the same but
within the same 8-bit block
1
IPa and IPb are not within the same
8-bit block but within the same 16-bit block
0
IPa and IPb are not within the same
16-bit block
.
(35)
The maximum similarity of all such IP pairs is selected as
the state of Y2. Therefore, Y2 has four states of {0, 1, 2, 3}
and Y2 = max(IPa,IPb) SIM (IPa, IPb).
• Same service: Y3 evaluates whether the two meta-alerts
share the same service (i.e., the same industrial control
protocol). There are two states of Y3: “yes” (1) and “no”
(0). A “no” is also specified if any of the input meta-alerts
does not have a related service.
Let x (x ∈ {0, 1}) represent the state of the root node in
Figure 14. Let yj (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) represent the state at each leaf
node Yj and ŷj represent the already observed state. There is a
conditional probability table (CPT) at each leaf node Yj which
relates Yj to X . As we stated in Section III-C, each entry
P (yj |x) in the table defines the probability of state yj of node
Yj given certain state x of node X . Since X is a root node
with no parent, we set pi(x) to be the prior probability P (x)
according to the boundary condition mentioned in Section
III-C. P (x) varies depending on the alert types of the two
input meta-alerts. There is a predefined prior probability for
each pair of alert types based on domain knowledge. And since
the state of Yj is already observed as ŷj , we have
λ(yj) =
{
1 if yj = ŷj
0 otherwise.
(36)
According to the bottom-up propagation step in the belief
propagation, the diagnostic support provided by Yk to X is
λYj (x) =
∑
yj
λ(yj)P (yj |x) = P (ŷj |x). Therefore, the belief
at root X can be calculated as
BEL(x) = αpi(x)
3∏
j=1
λYj (x) = αP (x)
3∏
j=1
P (ŷj|x), (37)
where α is a normalizing factor rendering
∑
x BEL(x) = 1.
We say two meta-alerts are correlated if BEL(1) > 0.5 for X .
Let a and b be the two input meta-alerts for the alert correlator.
We define the CORRELATE procedure of the alert correlator
as follows:
CORRELATE(a, b) =
{
BEL(1) if BEL(1) > 0.5
−1 otherwise,
(38)
D. Causal Reasoning Engine
The causal reasoning engine is the core component of
CAPTAR and it interacts with all other three components.
When the causal reasoning engine starts, it fetches copies of
attack templates AT s from the attack template database and
creates an attack template set ATS. Then it runs an anomaly
reasoning algorithm to perform alert matching and belief
propagation on the attack templates in the attack template set.
The meta-alerts used in the alert matching are retrieved from
the meta-alert database and the alert correlator is also used to
correlate meta-alerts during the matching process. The belief
propagation is introduced in Section III.
The anomaly reasoning algorithm is shown in Algorithm
1. The ANALYZEALERT procedure in this algorithm is called
whenever CAPTAR receives a new meta-alert or an update
to an existing alert. The procedure takes the meta-alert a and
the current attack template set ATS in the causal reasoning
engine as inputs. The output is a new attack template set
ATSnew with the meta-alert a matched to some of the
attack templates inside and belief propagation performed. The
procedure has two cases. If a is an update to an existing
meta-alert, then some attack templates in ATS might already
have a matched. For each AT of those attack templates, the
algorithm gets the node X in AT that a is matched to. Since
the meta-alert is updated, the procedure recalculates the total
confidence score CStotal (presented in Section IV-B) of X .
The diagnostic support λx˜(x) from all the matched alerts is
also recalculated. Since the evidence contained at X changes,
a belief propagation in AT from node X is initiated. In this
case, the ATS with the updated attack templates are directly
assigned to ATSnew for output. If a is a newly detected
meta-alert, the algorithm iterates over the entire set ATS.
For each attack template AT in ATS, it matches the meta-
alert a to nodes in AT and performs a belief propagation if
there is a successful match. This process is included in the
procedure called MATCHALERT. This procedure takes a and
AT as inputs and outputs a set of attack templatesATSmatch.
The attack templates in ATSmatch are copies of AT with a
matched and belief propagation performed. Since it is possible
that a can match to multiple nodes in AT , ATSmatch could
contain multiple copies. If a cannot be matched to AT ,
ATSmatch will just contain the original AT . After we get
ATSmatch from MATCHALERT(a,AT ), the attack templates
in ATSmatch are all added to ATSnew. After each run of
the algorithm, namely each call of procedureANALYZEALERT,
the attack template set ATS in the causal reasoning engine is
replaced byATSnew. The engine then checks BELmax(AT )
(defined in Section IV-B) of every attack template AT in the
new attack template set. If it finds BELmax(AT ) > θBEL for
any AT , it will output that attack template AT for operator’s
further analysis. Here θBEL is a predefined threshold and we
use θBEL = 0.8 for our CAPTAR prototype.
Algorithm 1 Anomaly Reasoning Algorithm
Input:
a - meta-alert to be analyzed
ATS - attack template set
Output:
ATSnew - new attack template set
procedure ANALYZEALERT(a,ATS)
ATSnew ← ∅
if a is an update of an existing meta-alert then
for each AT in ATS that has a as a matched alert
do
recalculate CStotal and λx˜(x) of the matched
node X
start a new belief propagation in AT from node
X
end for
ATSnew ← ATS
else
for each AT in ATS do
ATSmatch ← MATCHALERT(a,AT )
add ATSmatch to ATSnew
end for
end if
return ATSnew
end procedure
Before we introduce more details of the MATCHALERT
procedure, there are one concept and another procedure we
need to describe first. The concept is called happens before
and the procedure’s name is FINDCORRELATION. Happens
before is a relationship between two meta-alerts. We say meta-
alert a happens before meta-alert b if the start time of a is at
least Thb earlier than the start time of b, where Thb = 10s is
a predefined threshold. The procedure FINDCORRELATION is
shown in Algorithm 2. It takes a meta-alert a and a node X in
the attack template as inputs and outputs a correlation score
Cormax. The objective of this procedure is to find whether the
given node, its parents and children have any matched alert
that correlates with the given alert. The procedure does so by
iterating through every matched alert b of X , parents of X and
children of X . For each b, it calls the alert correlator and uses
the CORRELATE procedure to correlate a and b. The maximum
result from CORRELATE(a, b) is stored in Cormax. If any
correlation is found, Cormax contains the highest correlation
score. Otherwise, Cormax = 0. There are two exceptions
while correlating alerts from parents and children. For any
matched alert b of X’s parents, there is a conflict if a happens
before b. a is to be matched to X and X’s parents are attack
steps that should lead to X . If there is an attack, the attack
steps represented byX’s parents should be launched beforeX .
That means a could not happens before b. Therefore, a should
not be matched toX and the procedure outputs−1 in this case.
For any matched alert b of X’s children, the procedure outputs
−1 if b happens before a for similar reasons.
Algorithm 2 Find Correlation Procedure
Input:
a - meta-alert to find correlation with
X - a node in the attack template whose alert unit table
contains the alert type of a
Output:
Cormax - maximum correlation
procedure FINDCORRELATION(a,X)
Cormax ← 0
for each matched alert b of X do
Cormax ← max(Cormax,CORRELATE(a, b))
end for
for each parent U of X do
for each matched alert b of U do
if a happens before b then
return −1
end if
Cormax ← max(Cormax,CORRELATE(a, b))
end for
end for
for each child Y of X do
for each matched alert b of Y do
if b happens before a then
return −1
end if
Cormax ← max(Cormax,CORRELATE(a, b))
end for
end for
return Cormax
end procedure
After describing the happens before concept and the
FINDCORRELATION procedure, we can start looking at the
MATCHALERT procedure which is shown in Algorithm 3. It
takes a meta-alert a and an attack template AT as inputs and
outputs a setATSmatch containing attack templates generated
after matching. The objective of this procedure is to try to
match meta-alert a to the attack template AT . It iterates over
every node X in AT whose alert unit table contains alert type
of a. It calls the procedure FINDCORRELATION to correlate
a with X . If the result is greater than 0, it means a finds
correlation in X . If the result is 0, it means a finds no
correlation in X but it can be matched to X . We add X
to a potential node set Xpot. If the result is less than 0, it
means a could not be matched to X due to conflicts. If a
finds correlation in any node in AT , this means we have good
reason to believe a is triggered by the attack represented by
the current attack template AT . Therefore, we match a to the
node Xcor with the highest correlation score and start a belief
propagation from Xcor. In this case, the output will be a set
containing only the updated AT with a matched. If a finds
no correlation in AT but Xpot is not empty, this means there
is no proof that a is triggered by AT but there are attack
steps in AT that could potentially trigger a and the attack
steps are included in Xpot. Therefore, the procedure iterates
over Xpot explores every possibility. For every node X in
Xpot, it creates a new copy ATmatch of AT . Note that this
copy contains not only the nodes of AT but also all already
matched alerts of AT . It then matches a to X’s counterpart
in ATmatch and starts a belief propagation in ATmatch from
that node. By doing this, the procedure takes every potential
match of a in AT into consideration and the final output will
contain the original AT as well as all updated copies of it.
Finally, if there is no node in AT that a could match to, the
output will just contain the original AT .
Algorithm 3 Match Alert Procedure
Input:
a - meta-alert to be matched
AT - attack template
Output:
ATSmatch - attack template set after matching
procedure MATCHALERT(a,AT )
ATSmatch ← {AT }, Xcor ← None, Xpot ← ∅,
Cormax ← 0
for each node X in AT whose alert unit table contains
alert type of a do
Cor ← FINDCORRELATION(a,X)
if Cor > 0 then
if Cor > Cormax then
Cormax ← Cor , Xcor ← X
end if
else if Cor = 0 then
add X to Xpot
end if
end for
if Xcor is not None then
match a to Xcor and start the belief propagation of
AT from Xcor
else
for each node X in Xpot do
ATmatch ← copy of AT
match a to X in ATmatch and start a belief
propagation of ATmatch from X
add ATmatch to ATSmatch
end for
end if
return ATSmatch
end procedure
In the description of the MATCHALERT procedure, we
mentioned that the procedure will explore every potential
match of a and create multiple copies of the original attack
template AT if no exact match can be found. This will
increase the number of attack templates in the attack template
set ATS. To prevent the number of attack templates from
exploding, we set a maximum limitK for the number of attack
templates to keep for each kind of attack. Attack templates
with lower BELmax(AT ) will be dropped when the number
exceeds the limit. Also, attack templates will also be dropped
from the set if they have not been updated for a long time.
The attack templates, output by the causal reasoning en-
gine, represent attacks of high probability of existence in
the SCADA network. The operators can not only understand
the origin of the attacks by examining the belief of each
attack step and the corresponding alerts, but also evaluate the
attack consequences and take countermeasures by utilizing the
domain knowledge contained in the consequence nodes.
1) Example Run for the Anomaly Reasoning Algorithm:
We use an example to better illustrate the anomaly reasoning
algorithm. Consider the attack template AT in Figure 15. Let
us assume this is the only attack template in the database.
At the beginning of the anomaly reasoning, the causal rea-
soning engine fetches AT from the database and creates the
attack template set ATS = {AT } as shown in Figure 16.
Now the attacker first launched a man-in-the-middle attack.
CAPTAR receives an OPERATION_TOO_LATEmeta-alert a1
from EDMAND. This meta-alert a1 is first stored in the meta-
alert database and then fed into the causal reasoning engine.
Upon receiving this meta-alert a1, the engine calls the anomaly
reasoning algorithm. It finds that a1 is a new meta-alert, so
the procedure MATCHALERT is called to match a1 to the only
attack template AT in ATS. The MATCHALERT procedure
finds that node X1 is the only node whose alert unit tables
contains alert type OPERATION_TOO_LATE. Therefore, it
calls the procedure FINDCORRELATION with a1 and X1 as
inputs. The procedure FINDCORRELATION tries to find any
meta-alert in X1 and X3 that correlates with meta-alert a1.
However, since X1 and X3 have no matched alert yet, the
procedure finds no correlation and returns 0 in this case. Since
no correlation of a1 in the attack template AT is found andX1
is the only node that a1 can match to, a copy ÂT of the attack
template AT is created, and the meta-alert a1 is matched to
X̂1 in the copy ÂT . A belief propagation is performed on
ÂT . The MATCHALERT procedure returns both AT and ÂT .
Finally, both AT and ÂT are added to ATSnew to replace
ATS.
Fig. 15: Example attack template AT
Now the attacker intercepts and tampers with some binary
data. CAPTAR receives a meta-alert a2 with alert type of
BINARY_FAULT from EDMAND as shown in Figure 17. a2
is first stored in the meta-alert database and then forwarded to
the causal reasoning engine. The anomaly reasoning algorithm
again finds that a2 is a new meta-alert, so the procedure
MATCHALERT is called to match a2 to both AT and ÂT .
Matching a2 to AT is similar to matching a1 to AT and there
is no correlation of a2 in the attack template AT . Matching
a2 to ÂT is a bit different. The procedure finds that node X̂3
is the only node whose alert unit tables contains alert type
BINARY_FAULT. Therefore, the procedure FINDCORRELA-
TION is called with a2 and X̂3 as inputs. Since X̂1 is the
parent of X̂3 and a1 is a matched alert to X̂1. The procedure
sends both a2 and a1 to the alert correlator and finds that they
are correlated. Therefore, it returns the correlation score of a1
and a2. Since the FINDCORRELATION procedure finds one
correlation of a2 in the attack template ÂT , a2 is matched to
X̂3 and a belief propagation is performed on ÂT . After this
run, the attack template set ATS contains the original AT
and updated ÂT .
Later, EDMAND sends another updated BINARY_FAULT
meta-alert â2 to CAPTAR as shown in Figure 18. The anomaly
reasoning algorithm finds that â2 is an update to an existing
meta-alert a2. Also, it finds that ÂT in ATS contains a2.
Therefore, it replaces a2 with â2 in ÂT and starts new belief
propagations in ÂT . After this run, the causal reasoning engine
finds that BELmax(ÂT ) exceeds the predefined threshold.
Therefore, the engine outputs ÂT to the operator. The operator
can see from ÂT that there is a data integrity attack going on
and the attacker first launched a man in the middle attack
(MITM) to achieve that. The two matched alerts a1 and â2
can also be used for more detailed analysis by the operator.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the anomaly reasoning ability of
CAPTAR via three simulated attack scenarios. We implement
a prototype of CAPTAR and reuse our prototype of EDMAND
described in [1]. The baseline traffic is 14 days of simulated
DNP3 traffic of one control center communicating with 10
remote terminal units (RTUs). More details of the baseline
traffic can be found in [1]. We create three attack templates
representing three common attacks in SCADA networks: TCP
SYN flood, data integrity attack, and command injection.
• TCP SYN flood: The attack template for TCP SYN flood
is shown in Figure 19. The attacker starts by an IP address
scan to find out the active IP addresses in the subnet.
Then the TCP SYN flood is conducted by sending a
succession of SYN requests to the target with spoofed
source addresses.
• Data integrity attack: The attack template for data in-
tegrity attack is shown in Figure 20. The attacker first ei-
ther launches a man-in-the-middle attack or compromises
some field devices. The measurement data sent back to
the control center are then tampered to mislead the control
system.
Fig. 16: Algorithm run upon receiving meta-alert a1
Fig. 17: Algorithm run upon receiving meta-alert a2
Fig. 18: Algorithm run upon receiving meta-alert â2
Fig. 19: TCP SYN flood
• Command injection: The attack template for command
injection is shown in Figure 21. The attacker first either
launches a man-in-the-middle attack or conducts an IP
address scan followed by a service scan. Malicious con-
trol commands are then injected into the packets to attack
the substations.
Fig. 20: Data integrity attack
In our evaluation, we launch the above three attacks in
our simulated SCADA network. CAPTAR together with ED-
MAND are able to identify and differentiate all three attacks.
Moreover, the output of CAPTAR gives the operator a better
Fig. 21: Command injection
idea of the likelihood of each attack step even if there is no
direct alert representation of the step. For example, the attack
step of “compromised node” in the data integrity attack has no
detectable alert by EDMAND (for now). However, CAPTAR
can still infer the high chance of existence of a compromised
node if it sees the existence of the “data integrity attack”
consequence node and the absence of the “man in the middle”
node. Notice that the expressiveness of attack templates can be
improved by increasing the number of meta-alert types that can
be triggered by EDMAND. CAPTAR can also reason about
alerts not from EDMAND as long as they are preprocessed to
follow the same format.
We now briefly calculate the time complexity of the
anomaly reasoning algorithm. We start by estimating the
time complexity of the FINDCORRELATION procedure. Let
us assume M to be the number of meta-alerts in the database.
In the worst case, the FINDCORRELATION needs to correlate
the input meta-alert with all other meta-alerts. Since the time
complexity of correlating a pair of meta-alerts is constant, the
FINDCORRELATION procedure has a O(M) time complexity.
Let us assume the maximum number of nodes in any attack
template is N and L is the number of attack templates in
the database. In the MATCHALERT procedure, the first ‘for’
loop needs to go over every node in the template in the worst
case, which has a time complexity of O(MN). The belief
propagation is O(N), and Npot has N nodes in the worst
case. So the rest of the procedure has a time complexity
of O(N2). The total time complexity of MATCHALERT is
therefore O(MN +N2). In the anomaly reasoning algorithm,
the maximum attack template number is KL. It can be
easily derived that the time complexity of the algorithm is
O(KLN(M+N)). Usually, we haveM ≫ N , so the anomaly
reasoning algorithm has an estimated time complexity of
O(KLMN) in the worst case. K and N are usually less
than 10. L should be several dozens. M is also limited to
dozens or hundreds due to the alert aggregation and removing
of stale meta-alerts from the database. Therefore, the total time
complexity of the algorithm is reasonable. And notice that the
frequency CAPTAR runs the anomaly reasoning algorithm is
decided by the frequency that EDMAND sends meta-alerts. As
mentioned in [1], EDMAND sends meta-alerts in a periodic
manner only if there are updates to those meta-alerts in the
latest period. So the sending rate of meta-alerts by EDMAND
is also limited. Therefore, CAPTAR is able to satisfy the real-
time anomaly reasoning need for those meta-alerts.
To give a better understanding of the time overhead of
CAPTAR, we measure the time to run the FINDCORRELATION
procedure, the belief propagation, and the anomaly reasoning
algorithm for the three attack scenarios on a Ubuntu 16.04
desktop with 12 Intel Xeon 3.60GHz CPUs and 16GB mem-
ory. For each attack scenario, we run CAPTAR on the entire
traffic set including the corresponding attack and calculate
the average and standard deviation in millisecond of the time
overheads for FINDCORRELATION, belief propagation, and
the anomaly reasoning algorithm. We also record the sample
number, which is the number of time FINDCORRELATION,
belief propagation, and the anomaly reasoning algorithm have
been performed. The results are shown in Table VI. We can see
that the time overheads are definitely small enough to satisfy
the real-time reasoning requirement of the meta-alerts. Note
that the average time to run the FINDCORRELATION procedure
and the anomaly reasoning algorithm varies a lot across
different attack scenarios. This is because the time overheads
of FINDCORRELATION and the anomaly reasoning algorithm
depend on the number of meta-alert M as we described
previously. And those three attack scenarios generate 104(TCP
SYN flood), 7(data integrity attack), and 26(command injec-
tion) meta-alerts respectively. This results in the different time
overheads of FINDCORRELATION and the anomaly reasoning
algorithm for them. Another fact is that all the time overheads
have relatively high standard deviation. This is mainly due
to the change to meta-alert number in the meta-alert database
during the attack. As the attack continues, the number of meta-
alerts in the database increases, and so do the time overheads
for FINDCORRELATION, belief propagation, and the anomaly
reasoning algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this report, we propose a causal-polytree-based anomaly
reasoning framework for SCADA networks, named CAPTAR.
CAPTAR takes the meta-alerts from EDMAND and performs
alert correlation and attack plan recognition. Experiments
using a prototype of CAPTAR and simulated traffic show that
CAPTAR is able to detect and differentiate various attack
scenarios in a real-time manner. The generated reasoning
results can provide the operators with a high-level view of
the security state of the protected SCADA network.
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LATION, belief propagation, and the anomaly reasoning algorithm
specific commercial product, process, or service by trade
name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not nec-
essarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation,
or favoring by the United States Government or any agency
thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein
do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or any agency thereof.
REFERENCES
[1] W. Ren, T. Yardley, and K. Nahrstedt, “EDMAND: Edge-Based Multi-
Level Anomaly Detection for SCADA Networks,” in 2018 IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing
Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–
7.
[2] A. Valdes and K. Skinner, “Probabilistic alert correlation,” in Interna-
tional Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection. Springer,
2001, pp. 54–68.
[3] F. Cuppens, “Managing alerts in a multi-intrusion detection environ-
ment,” in acsac. IEEE, 2001, p. 0022.
[4] S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney, “Practical automated
detection of stealthy portscans,” Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10,
no. 1-2, pp. 105–136, 2002.
[5] A. Siraj and R. B. Vaughn, “Multi-level alert clustering for intrusion
detection sensor data,” in NAFIPS 2005-2005 Annual Meeting of the
North American Fuzzy Information Processing Society. IEEE, 2005,
pp. 748–753.
[6] S. Zhang, J. Li, X. Chen, and L. Fan, “Building network attack graph
for alert causal correlation,” Computers & security, vol. 27, no. 5-6, pp.
188–196, 2008.
[7] L. Briesemeister, S. Cheung, U. Lindqvist, and A. Valdes, “Detection,
correlation, and visualization of attacks against critical infrastructure
systems,” in 2010 Eighth International Conference on Privacy, Security
and Trust. IEEE, 2010, pp. 15–22.
[8] Y. Zhai, P. Ning, P. Iyer, and D. S. Reeves, “Reasoning about com-
plementary intrusion evidence,” in 20th Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference. IEEE, 2004, pp. 39–48.
[9] Z. Zali, M. R. Hashemi, and H. Saidi, “Real-time attack scenario detec-
tion via intrusion detection alert correlation,” in 2012 9th International
ISC Conference on Information Security and Cryptology. IEEE, 2012,
pp. 95–102.
[10] A. Valdes and K. Skinner, “Adaptive, model-based monitoring for cyber
attack detection,” in International Workshop on Recent Advances in
Intrusion Detection. Springer, 2000, pp. 80–93.
[11] F. Xuewei, W. Dongxia, H. Minhuan, and S. Xiaoxia, “An approach
of discovering causal knowledge for alert correlating based on data
mining,” in 2014 IEEE 12th International Conference on Dependable,
Autonomic and Secure Computing. IEEE, 2014, pp. 57–62.
[12] F. Kavousi and B. Akbari, “A Bayesian network-based approach for
learning attack strategies from intrusion alerts,” Security and Communi-
cation Networks, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 833–853, 2014.
[13] A. A. Ramaki, M. Amini, and R. E. Atani, “RTECA: Real time
episode correlation algorithm for multi-step attack scenarios detection,”
computers & security, vol. 49, pp. 206–219, 2015.
[14] X. Qin, “A probabilistic-based framework for infosec alert correlation,”
Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005.
[15] J. Pearl, Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of
plausible inference. Elsevier, 2014.
